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Established commentary on Robert Browning's dramatic monologue The 
Ring and the Book has largely been restricted to accounts of subjectivity. This 
study continues that long tradition by examining speakers' production of 
subjectivity, but extends the discussion to considering the political implications of 
the personal word. Theories of the Russian literary theorist and critic Mikhail 
Bakhtin are employed to observe individual speakers' constructions of selfhood. 
However, unlike the traditional monological model, Bakhtin's model of dialogism 
allows for further examination of the personal word when it inevitably encounters, 
and subsequently struggles politically with, social and institutional discourses. 
Hence, this study is distinct from the long tradition of monological criticism of 
The Ring and the Book in its examination of the personal word as political 
contest. 
I focus upon three books that have received relatively little direct critical 
attention in comparison to others within The Ring and the Book. Books II-IV, 
Half-Rome, Other Half-Rome, and Tertium Quid, often called the opening triad, 
differ from the others in the poem because the speakers act as social figures--both 
personal and representative of social views. These books also offer an advantage 
of being possibly the least critically trammelled of the twelve books that make up 
the poem. Furthermore, commentary which does attend to this triad almost 
invariably consigns these speakers to the role of chorus or supporting cast to the 
brighter 'stars' whose narratives follow. 
Whereas standard readings of the poem have tended to privilege one or 
more books as a location of truth, the dialogic model allows a re-examination of 
the poem as a progression of dramatic monologues without the need to privilege 
any particular speaker's word. As a modest first step in this enterprise, this thesis 
examines the opening triad for evidence of a struggle through language by the 
speakers, at both the personal and the political levels. Bakhtin would perhaps 
observe that this thesis, too, now joins the political struggle of language by 
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becoming a prior utterance that could influence future critical commentary of The 
Ring and the Book. 
I am indebted to Warwick Slinn for his rigorous and provocative 
encouragement, to Michelle Dawson for acting as my interlocutor, and to my son 
Jacob for his support: 
A word in the mouth of a particular individual person is a product 
of the living interaction of social forces. 
V. N. Volosinov 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Personal Word and its Political Struggle 
I 
The Ring and the Book1 consists of twelve separate poems spoken by ten 
narrators. Criticism has traditionally assumed the authority of the single, 
speaking (poetic) voice. For example, critics have usually described the first and 
final monologues as the voice of an over-arching narrator who functions as a 
surrounding frame for the ten remaining poems. Recent criticism still often 
follows this strong tradition by treating the speaker of Books I and XII as the 
voice of Robert Browning himself. J.J.Joyce writes: 
Books I and XII are a sort of "ring" of creative insight which 
encloses the other ten monologues. Browning's voice in these two 
books stands as authoritative in its pronouncements on the 
personalities, actions, and moral natures of the other nine speakers 
of the work. 2 
Dorothy Mermin goes further: 
Judgement is made easy: Browning tells us what to think of the 
characters before they say a word, and they are never allowed to 
mislead or confuse us. 3 
As recently as 1987 Paul Zietlow comments that, "for good reason, Browning is 
only half-playful in accusing the British public of liking him not (I.1379). "4 It 
is tempting and it has been traditionally acceptable to link the contents of a poem 
with the context of the poet's life, and then to draw significance from the 
comparison. On the other hand, in rejection of this approach, New Criticism 
eschewed recourse to biography of the poet, or to the social condition at the time 
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of the work's production. According to John Crowe Ransom, critics should 
recognize "the autonomy of the work itself as existing for its own sake. "5 
This thesis does not subscribe to either of these extremes. Instead it 
investigates a theory of language which posits that all utterances--spoken or 
written, fictive or not--are inherently dialogical. Briefly, Mikhail Bakhtin's 
theory of dialogism suggests that a word--any word--responds to prior utterance, 
and that each word in turn anticipates further response. Therefore the meaning 
of 'reality'--including the meaning of the very people involved in creating 
meaning--becomes a dynamic process of struggle. A word contests previous, 
present and possible future attempts at imbuing it with meaning, while 
simultaneously proposing its own 'truth'. This continual struggle is always 
carried out on the site of language, and at both the personal and political levels. 
Bakhtin's theory enables Browning's The Ring and the Book to be considered 
dialogically in relation to the poet himself, or in relation to any other relative 
factor, be it literary, social, or historical. This thesis uses the dialogic model, 
first, to observe how a selection of speakers construct their own selfhood through 
language, and secondly, to examine how those speakers employ the personal word 
to engage other discourses in political contest for ideological and hegemonic 
supremacy. 
II 
The dialogic model and the monologic model differ markedly in the 
authority each invests in the single, speaking voice. For example, traditional 
criticism has tended to privilege the author's and narrator's position when 
attempting to locate meaning or 'truth' within a text. Behind or within dramatic 
monologues an 'essential' meaning has traditionally been sought. By contrast, the 
dialogic model--in a manner similiar to post-structuralist models of criticism--
locates meaning within the process of language itself. Rather than identifying an 
authoritative voice through which an essential meaning may be sought, dialogic 
criticism focuses instead upon the political activity of language through which 
narrators and even authors construct themselves, and through which meaning is 
generated. 
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Traditional criticism has generally been dismissive of the role of the 
auditor in dramatic monologues. In The Poetry of Experience, Robert 
Langbaum's seminal text on the dramatic monologue form, he writes: 
.. .it makes so little difference, as long as the speaker's attention is 
directed outward, whether the dramatic monologue has or has not 
an ostensible auditor; for ultimately the speaker speaks to 
understand something about himself.6 
A dialogic model on the other hand posits the auditor in a dramatic monologue 
as real, not ostensible, and as always present. However, there is no requirement 
for the auditor to be physically present at the narration, and she may even be 
notional. A redefinition will therefore be necessary, later in this chapter, of what 
a 'real' auditor is within a dialogic model. 
The model also contests Langbaum's notions of the autonomy and 
essentialism of a speaker: 
Not only does the speaker direct his address outward as in dialogue 
but the style of address gives the effect of a closed circuit, with the 
speaker directing his address outwards in order that it may return 
with a meaning he was not aware of when sending it forth. I say 
a closed circuit because the utterance seems to be directed only 
obliquely at the ostensible auditor, and seems never to reach its 
ultimate goal with him. Nor does the essential interchange take 
place with the auditor; for even where the auditor's remarks are 
implied, the speaker never learns anything from them and they do 
not change the meaning of the utterance. If the speaker represents 
one voice of a dialogue, then his other self is the essential second 
voice in that it sends back his own voice with a difference. (Poetry 
of Experience 191) 
Langbaum's monologic model assumes that the speaker is autonomous: the 
"essential interchange" takes place with an "essential second voice" which is "his 
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other self". Dialogism challenges the notion that there is an essential self. 
Rather, it posits that the self is in a constant process of construction, via 
language, through the other (the auditor). In a sense Langbaum does allow for 
this process--he simply regards it as a closed, circular process. Provided one 
remains within the boundaries of Langbaum' s assumed subjectivity, his process 
remains valid, but it completely ignores the role of language, which is the basis 
of the dialogic model. Langbaum regards the other (the "essential second voice") 
as a mirror which leads back to the self--it is an image produced by the self, 
which is an idealist model. Elsewhere, he elaborates on this "closed circuit" 
paradigm: 
... the speaker directs his address outward in order to address 
himself, and makes an objective discovery in order to discover 
himself. No matter how dramatic the dramatic monologue is, no 
matter how far outward it moves, its development is lyrical in that 
the speaker does not develop outwards towards an external ideal, 
he does not change moral direction as a result of the 
circumstances; he rather makes the circumstances a part of himself 
as he develops inwards towards an intenser manifestation of his 
own nature. (200) 
Langbaum' s position is 'essentialist' in that he subscribes to the long-standing 
Western philosophical belief in a fixed centre or essence to the self, whose 
discovery, according to the monologic model, the dramatic monologue facilitates. 
This essence is a transcendent truth, the search for which has become the prime 
objective of many critics and readers of dramatic monologues. 
claims: 
In applying this monologic model to The Ring and the Book, Langbaum 
All the established institutions for distinguishing right from wrong-
the law, the Church, the authority of parents and husbands-all have 
been either entirely wrong, or if partly right have still missed the 
main point, Pompilia's absolute goodness and Guido's badness." 
(113) 
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These 'essential' values--right and wrong, good and bad--are those of the 
individual self, including Langbaum's. He marginalizes the political truths within 
society through his model's failure to recognize that self and society are relative. 
An individual can locate personal 'truth' through and relative to the ideological 
discourse of external structures of society. The dialogic model returns politics to 
the arena of critical discussion, and examines the personal word in its political 
contest with the external discourses of society. 
Recently critics have begun questioning the monologic model in various 
ways. For example, E. W.Slinn illustrates how attempts by so much established 
commentary to separate truth from falsehood involved or produced a separation 
of truth (transcendence) from language (medium). 7 He contrasts this with a post-
structuralist approach which locates truth, not as a product, but "as process, truth 
in the making, and in that process truth is both subverted by language and 
produced by it" (Discourse of Self 123). He explains that the poem's multiplicity 
results in "only a series of texts which provide the contexts for each other's 
function and meaning. " Rather than language revealing a hidden truth or 
meaning, "the poem presents truth and language as interdependent, as conceptual 
themes interwoven through dialectical process." Slinn includes the poet/speaker 
of Books I and XII of The Ring and the Book in this process, whom he 
distinguishes from "the biological referent Robert Browning". Slinn argues that 
the two books are not frames that sit outside the piece itself; rather, the 
poet/speaker, as with the other speakers, is "the produced subject of the language 
and contents" of his own speeches (128 and 204, n18). His challenge to the 
monological model underscores meaning as language process, and also reinforces 
the loss of singular authority in this process. 8 Similarly, A.Potkay observes that 
criticism of The Ring and the Book "with few exceptions, unites in assigning an 
infallible centre of authority to the poem." He notes of the twelve books that "no 
one interpretation . . . can claim absolute validity or transparent truth. "9 This 
thesis, too, treats truth as a subordinate issue, not as unimportant to the poem, but 
as secondary to the process of language through which the speakers construct their 
realities and 'truths'. 
Dialogism, as a theory of individual process, applies equally to fictive as 
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well as non-fictive discourse. For this reason application of dialogism to speakers 
within the frame of a book of dramatic monologues is not a special case, but is 
normative. The speakers within The Ring and the Book must define, present 
and re-present themselves, vis-a-vis other individuals and politically within 
society, through language. The process for each of them and for each of us is the 
same, and differs only in time and space. The dramatic monologues can thus be 
read and studied as complex dialogues. I restrict discussion in this study to three 
speakers within The Ring and the Book--Book II (Half-Rome), Book III (Other 
Half-Rome), and Book IV (Tertium Quid). Each speaker is examined, first, in 
terms of his construction of subjectivity through his personal word. However, as 
their names suggest, each speaker is also the sign for ideological forces of Roman 
society within The Ring and the Book. Dialogism posits that the personal word 
enters into political contest with other ideological discourses as individuals define 
their selves through the language of external social structures. Half-Rome, Other 
Half-Rome, and Tertium Quid usefully illustrate the personal word struggling for 
ideological supremacy against and through hegemonic discourses. The more overt 
political roles of these three narratives reveal how individual discourses overlap 
with the wider social and institutional discourses. 
Some commentators dismiss Books II, III, and IV as mere sideshows to 
the main action that is to follow, rather than as the process of language through 
which later speakers are being 'written'. J.J.Joyce, for example, attempts to 
impose musical form upon Books II-XI to prove that organizational structure 
exists. In contrast to Slinn, Joyce begins by claiming that "monologues I and XII 
stand apart from the other books in that the monologist in both these poems is 
the persona, Robert Browning quite obviously a speaker whose function contrasts 
with the other voices of Books II-XI. 1110 Joyce writes: 
The Monologists of Books II, III, and IV ... and Books VII, IX, 
and X ... are outsiders, characters whose knowledge of the 
murders of the Comparini family is not first hand. They are 
apologists and interpreters, each in his own way a judge of events 
in which Guido, Caponsacchi, and Pompilia . . . have been the 
actors. Each of the speakers in the first and third triad,offers a 
verdict of some sort on the actions of the speakers of the central 
triad. (303) 
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Dialogism would suggest that Joyce is privileging essential "events" over society's 
ideological construction of them. The assumption is that the "actors" (in whose 
play is moot!) of his second "triad" are not affected in areas such as expectation, 
ideology, or language by the prior raging debate within Roman society. Further, 
Joyce implies that the subsequent third "triad" construct their narratives 
independently of the six previous semiotic constructions of reality. Dialogism 
contends that all twelve monologues are spoken by "actors" who in tum "judge", 
"interpret", and construct events through their personal and political use of 
language. 
Books II, III and IV of The Ring and the Book provide useful test cases 
for the dialogic model. Almost all earlier criticism of this opening traid has been 
from the perspective of traditional models, hence the opening triad provides ample 
scope for critical re-appraisal using a different model. Furthermore, even within 
established criticism, the three opening speakers have generally been marginalised 
as supporting cast to the subsequent 'main characters' whose narratives even today 
occupy most scholarly attention. Yet behind dialogism stands the political 
implications and ramifications of prior utterance upon present and future speakers. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to trace possible impact or influence from the 
opening triad upon subsequent narratives in The Ring and the Book, but in 
keeping with the dialogic model, the possibility of such political struggle through 
language remains implied. The opening triad will be examined as merely three 
voices within the personal and political process of a chain of dialogic utterances 
that extends back before, and also beyond the boundaries of The Ring and the 
Book. 
III 
Mikhail Bakhtin's ideas can be traced back to his early immersion in the 
Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, but he was not to embrace the Marburg 
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philosophy nor Kantianism wholeheartedly .11 Bakhtin begins by accepting that 
there is an 'unbridgeable' gap between mind and world. Much of his life's work, 
especially in dialogism, focuses upon that gap. He neither dismisses the world 
in favour of only the mind, as did Hermann Cohen, leading exponent of the 
Marburg School. Nor does he consign the Ding-an-sich (thing-in-itself) concept 
to the realm of the eternally unknowable. For Bakhtin, the very capacity to have 
knowledge is based upon a process of dialogue; and, by definition, dialogue 
requires the existence of an other. However, the other always resides on the 
opposite side of the gap to the self. 
Bakhtin's major premise is that "the organising centre of any utterance, of 
any experience, is not within but outside - in the social milieu surrounding the 
individual being. "12 This apparent denial of the subject is based on Bakhtin's 
belief that we can never see or know ourselves. Even to look at ourselves in a 
mirror is to look out from the mind, across a spatial gap at an object located in 
the outside world. We can see and know only of the other; only through the 
other's point of view can we gain some measure of apperception. This lack of 
knowledge about the self includes even our birth and death, and our physical 
presence at a given moment: 
My temporal and spatial boundaries are not given for me, but the 
other is entirely given. I enter into the spatial world, but the other 
has always resided in it. 13 
Everything that pertains to the individual's concept of self, beginning with gender 
and name, enters the consciousness through others, in their emotional and 
value-assigning tonality: 
I live in a world of others' words. And my entire life is an 
orientation in this world, a reaction to others' words (an infinitely 
diverse reaction), beginning with my assimilation of them (in the 
process of initial mastery of speech) and ending with assimilation 
of the wealth of human culture (expressed in the word or in other 
semiotic materials). 14 
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To express oneself is not merely a means to make oneself an object for another, 
but also for oneself (what Bakhtin calls "the actualizing of consciousness"). This 
rebuts any suggestion that the self is a copy or re-presentation of an other. 
Bakhtin's paradigm of self and other has a further component--language 
itself. He writes: 
There are no "neutral" words and forms - words and forms that 
can belong to "no one"; language has been completely taken over, 
shot through with intentions and accents. For any individual 
consciousness living in it, language is not an abstract system of 
normative forms but rather a concrete heteroglot conception of the 
world. All words have the "taste" of a profession, a genre, a 
tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a 
generation, an age group, the day and hour. Each word tastes of 
the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged 
life; all words and forms are populated by intentions. Contextual 
overtones (generic, tendentious, individualistic) are inevitable in 
the word. 15 
For the individual consciousness, language lies on the borderline (or in the gap) 
between one's self and the other. Bakhtin's dialogism by definition requires that 
at all times there must be an other if the process of apperception is to occur. But 
the other has no greater transcendental control of her utterances than has the self. 
Michael Holquist argues that the western humanist tradition of a close bond being 
felt between the sense I have of myself as a unique being and the being of my 
language ("/ own meaning"), has an opposite in what he defines as the 
deconstructionist view ("No one owns meaning"). He argues that dialogism holds 
a third position ("We own meaning ... or ... if we do not own it, we may at least 
rent meaning") .16 Neither Holquist nor Bakhtin is suggesting that the we who 
own or rent the meaning are an accumulation; rather, their emphasis is upon the 
process. Dialogism's emphasis is upon the dynamic interaction between self and 
other, with the word as the ground of contention, the point of struggle, the 
mediation that is the battle. 
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The individual consciousness is neither an autonomous locus of meaning 
and identity, nor is it a passive receptacle capable of being "filled up" with the 
meaning and identity bestowed by langue. The individual consciousness is not 
even a hapless victim of colonisation by some hegemonic ideology of others: there 
always remains the privilege of psychosis. Individual consciousness gains a 
conception of its self through the perception of the other, but only via a shared 
reality conveyed through the dynamic of dialogic utterance. Utterance organises 
experience. It gives experience of the other--and through the other, the self--the 
form and specificity of direction necessary for an individual to function as such. 
The word "interlocutor" is favoured in this study to describe the person 
being addressed. It is "one who takes part in a dialogue, conversation, or 
discussion" .17 The term auditor ("a hearer, listener; one of an audience") 
suggests a passive response to the speaker, while a dialogue requires an active 
addressee. Bakhtin defines passive response as that which has no effect whatever 
upon the utterance. Examples of this are rare: even an ancient ritualistic prayer 
(provided it can still be linguistically comprehended) is dialogic. The prayer 
would originally have been uttered to provoke a response among votaries, and 
may still trigger reactive utterances many centuries later. The speaker's need for 
an active participant as interlocutor is crucial to dialogism. This interlocutor need 
not be physically present, and may even be notional. It is this concept that 
prompted Holquist to insist that the plural we rent the meaning of language. In 
an interview Bakhtin explains: 
In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person 
who understands to be located outside the object of his or her 
creative understanding--in time, in space, in culture. For one 
cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a 
whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior 
can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are 
located outside us in space and because they are others. 18 
The question this raises is who 'understands' --the speaker or the interlocutor? 
Since neither stands outside the dialogue, it follows that neither fully understands. 
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According to Bakhtin, each listener can understand the speaker, but cannot 
understand her self when she speaks. Both parties of the dialogue are structured 
by the process; hence mutual understanding must always reside somewhere 
between them. Bakhtin is aware that this approach is contrary to the received 
romantic notion of language and speech: 
Language is regarded from the speaker's standpoint as if there 
were only one speaker who does not have any necessary relation 
to other participants in speech communication. If the role of the 
other is taken into account at all, it is the role of a listener, who 
understands the speaker only passively. 19 
Bakhtin argues that terms such as "listener" and "understander", when used 
merely as partners of the "speaker", are fictions "which produce a completely 
distorted idea of the complex and multifaceted process of active speech 
communication." He rails against the "unified flow" graphic-schematic depictions 
of the speaker and listener in speech communication.20 
The fact is that when the listener perceives and understands the 
meaning (the language meaning) of speech, he simultaneously takes 
an active responsive attitude towards it. He either agrees or 
disagrees with it (completely or partially), augments it, applies it, 
prepares for its execution, and so on .... Any understanding is 
imbued with response and necessarily elicits it in one form or 
another: the listener becomes the speaker. (Speech Genres 68) 
Of course, Bakhtin allows for "responsive understanding with a delayed reaction 
[since] sooner or later what is heard and actively understood will find its response 
in the subsequent speech or behaviour of the listener" (69). For example, 
Half-Rome, Other Half-Rome, and Tertium Quid each orientate their 
communication precisely towards such an actively responsive understanding, since 
each expects "response, agreement, sympathy, objection, execution, and so forth" 
(Speech Genres 69). In Other Half-Rome's case, the notional Guido of the 
concluding few lines is the internalised other of the speaker himself. 
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Bakhtin takes dialogue to its conclusion by casting the speaker in the role 
of respondent to some degree. She is not, he argues, the first speaker "who 
disturbs the eternal silence of the universe". Her role as respondent presupposes 
not only the existence of the language system she is using, but also the existence 
of preceding utterances--both by her and by others--with which her own utterances 
contend, build upon, or at least presume to be known to the interlocutor. Thus 
any utterance becomes a link in a complex network of utterances. 
In looking at language, Bakhtin maintains that it is only during the process 
of creating an utterance that a word becomes a "spark of expression" (Speech 
Genres 86). That expression exists neither in the system of language nor in the 
objective reality surrounding us. It is only in the act of utterance--"the contact 
between language meaning and the concrete reality"--then, that expression (self) 
is constituted. 
Thus, emotion, evaluation, and expression are foreign to the word 
of language and are born only in the process of its live usage in a 
concrete utterance. The meaning of a word in itself (unrelated to 
actual reality) is ... out of the range of emotion .... [Words] acquire 
their expressive colouring only in the utterance, and this colouring 
is independent of their meaning taken individually and abstractly. 
(Speech Genres 87) 
Further, Bakhtin argues that when we construct an utterance, instead of taking 
words from the language in their dictionary form, we usually take them from 
other utterances. Thus we take words from parole rather than from langue. 
Therefore, according to Bakhtin, a word exists for a speaker in three ways. First, 
it is a neutral (dictionary) word in the language which belongs to nobody in 
which, according to Holquist, no one owns the meaning of the word. Secondly, 
the word exists as an other's word, belonging to another person and filled with 
echoes of the other's utterance. Thirdly, the word exists for a speaker as her own 
word, for, since she is dealing with it in a particular situation, with a particular 
speech plan, it becomes associated (but not imbued) with her "spark of 
expression". In the latter two cases the word appears to be expressive, but this 
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expression does not adhere to the word itself. It is only within the utterance that 
there is expression. From this, Bakhtin concludes that: 
... all our utterances (including creative works), [are] filled with 
others' words, varying degrees of otherness or varying degrees of 
'our-own-ness', varying degrees of awareness and detachment. 
These words of others carry with them their own expression, their 
own evaluative tone, which we assimilate, rework, and 
re-accentuate. (Speech Genres 89) 
The expressiveness of words--including 'our-own-ness'--does not issue directly 
from the language system (langue), but is rather an echo of another's individual 
expression, which makes the word representative of another's whole utterance 
from a particular evaluative or ideological position. In the case of Other 
Half-Rome, for instance, Count Guido does not have to be physically present to 
be the interlocutor; the speaker already contends with the interlocutor's evaluative 
position and hence is already engaging in a dialogue. Before Other Half-Rome 
spoke, utterance existed. 
Utterance already exists with regard to the contents of each of Books II, 
III, and IV. The murders have already been subjected to societal and cultural 
assessment. Indeed, in ideological terms they had already been assessed before 
they occurred, or society would not have had the language with which to discuss 
them. Therefore, in this sense any utterance is a political re-assessment, as 
Bakhtin notes: 
The speaker is not the biblical Adam, dealing only with virgin and 
still unnamed objects, giving them names for the first time. (Speech 
Genres 93) 
Half-Rome's opening line, "What, you, Sir, come too?" (II.1), is part of a greater 
dialogue. Half-Rome's speech is a rejoinder in a larger utterance of twelve books 
about the Roman murders. Thus from a reader's point of view, the "come to 
what" query implicit in Book II is part of a dialogue that began in Book I. Were 
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we to take Book II in isolation, the same argument holds, except that we readers 
would not yet understand to what Half-Rome was referring. The past participle 
"come" implies an auxiliary "have" which has been deleted. Coupled with the 
adverb "too", this question assumes prior knowledge. Both Half-Rome and his 
interlocutor have arrived at the Lorenzo Church as a result of prior common 
knowledge. Half-Rome's rejoinder is in response to a prior utterance that they 
both share. Half-Rome's sentence is an anaphoric reference to received knowledge 
prior to the dialogue between him and his interlocutor. Bakhtin would claim that 
it must be anaphoric, or the two could not communicate; indeed, it must always 
be anaphoric because all utterances have dialogic undertones, even if only at the 
level of langue. 
In terms of the future, Half-Rome speaks in anticipation of an active 
response from the interlocutor. That response may be only an active responsive 
understanding, but nevertheless the interlocutor's activity will affect Half-Rome's 
narrative. Half-Rome serves notice in his first line that he has purpose in mind 
by parenthetically noting, "Just the man I'd meet". Although we do not know this 
till later, he veils a warning to his interlocutor shortly after when he refers to 
Honoris causd as the reason for Violante's horrific wounds. Within a few lines 
of the beginning of Half-Rome's narrative, we have evidence that it refers 
backwards (Half-Rome intends actively reassessing and reinterpreting knowledge 
that both he and his interlocutor share) and it refers forwards (Half-Rome has 
persuasive designs over his interlocutor). 
Other Half-Rome's interlocutor is, as we shall see in Chapter Three, 
marginalized to the point of near-invisibility. Even if we accept his physical 
presence, his role in Book III conforms to that of Other Half-Rome's internalised 
other. The interlocutor may be seen in the guise of the like-minded public of 
Other Half-Rome; Book III, therefore, assumes its identity as--simplistically--the 
voice of those who side with Pompilia. An argument against a dialogic reading 
of Book III would suggest that Other Half-Rome's speech is simply a monologue 
to confirm the speaker's thoughts and attitudes. Presumably, this entails Other 
Half-Rome talking to himself. But is this not tantamount to a dialogue between 
aspects of himself? Within his self he is divisible into speaker and interlocutor--
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self and other. Furthermore, if attitudes are to be confirmed, they necessarily had 
to exist prior to the process of confirmation. Therefore they may be traced back 
to prior utterance. If the prior utterance was by Other Half-Rome himself at 
some earlier point, then a dialogue still exists between the present speaker and an 
earlier self. The Pope, for example, adopts this last dialogic process in Book X. 
Alternatively, if Other Half-Rome is using the speech of Book III not to 
confirm existing attitudes but to persuade himself, then the utterance becomes per 
sea dialogue between contending voices within. Each "self" would then represent 
differing discourses drawn from within society, or from different temporal selves 
within his consciousness, and each would speak in that voice. In either of these 
apparently non-dialogic arguments, Other Half-Rome's utterance of Book III 
involves an internal debate whose conflict requires the existence of prior utterance 
and of competing selves. The voices of those in Book III who side with Pompilia 
against Guido, and whose utterances we detect as undertones to that of Other 
Half-Rome, may then be defined dialogically as the hegemonic inner sociality of 
the speaker. 
IV 
The dialogic model suggests that the most obvious struggle taking place 
at any given time in The Rin~ and the Book is at the level of the individual. This 
chapter argues that Half-Rome, Other Half-Rome, and Tertium Quid engage in 
elaborate dialogues with interlocutors who are either present, or are notional, but 
are nonetheless equally 'real' in terms of dialogic effect. The dialogues are not 
of choice; they are necessary for consciousness to occur within each individual. 
Thus far I have argued that the other is necessary for the self to construct 
a personal identity. To test this model, we need to ponder the consequences of 
a speaker who is not able to conduct a dialogue. Suppose a speaker were unable 
to locate an interlocutor on the literal level. Would it be likely (or even possible) 
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that she would also not be able to conjure up a notional partner capable of acting 
as interlocutor? 
D.K.Danow, following Bakhtin, observes that a restriction of dialogic 
interaction "bears a certain tragic potential, borne out repeatedly in the linked 
realms of the personal and political, where violence as a response--verbal or 
otherwise--represents the negative correlative of dialogue. "21 Presumably, the 
frustrated and violent response of Guido represents the failure of an inner voice 
to engage in dialogue. Violence would then become his only means of 
communication. Bakhtin believes that it is an essential characteristic of the word 
(and human beings) to communicate: 
[It is] the nature of the word, which always wants to be heard, 
always seeks responsive understanding, and does not stop at 
immediate understanding but presses on further and further 
(indefinitely). 22 
This requirement to be heard is never more obvious than at the conclusion of 
Book XI, when "the word ... fears the third party [here, the Pope] and seeks only 
temporary recognition (responsive understanding of limited depth) from immediate 
addressees 11 (Speech Genres 127). But instead, Guido receives no response, and 
is driven to despair. He searches for any word "out of the world of words" 
(XI.2416) that will engage his interlocutors in dialogue, but without success. 
Bakhtin believes that an individual must be heard in order to exist. "To be means 
to communicate. Absolute death (non-being) is the state of being unheard, 
unrecognized, unremembered. "23 Guido's babble becomes monologic as he 
desperately seeks recognition through others: 
I am yours, 
I am the Granduke's - no, I am the Pope's! 
Abate, - Cardinal, - Christ, - Maria, - God, ... 
(XI.2422-24) 
A dialogic reading suggests that it is at the ellipsis in line 2424 that Guido is 
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destroyed as a self. Bakhtin wrote that "for the word (and consequently, for a 
human being) there is nothing more terrible than a lack of response" (Speech 
Genres 127). The irony of Guido's concluding line--"Pompilia, will you let them 
murder me?" (XI.2425)--is, in fact, the establishment of dialogic relations 
between Guido and Pompilia, which is necessary for Guido's consciousness and 
identity. It is not relevant that the physical woman Pompilia is dead. In the 
absence of any response from the others to whom he directs his utterances, Guido 
constructs an internalised Pompilia who will respond as an other to his self. Even 
the signified God is no longer available to him as an other, presumably because 
of ideological restrictions placed upon Guido by a hegemonic inner sociality. His 
constructed Pompilia becomes active ("let"), and he has become dependent upon 
her. He defines his dependence through her. Guido has reconstructed himself 
through dialogic interaction with Pompilia. 
We have observed the failure of the word to be heard, and the lengths an 
individual will go to receive recognition. Bakhtin was adamant on this point: 
A single person, remaining alone with himself, cannot make ends 
meet even in the deepest and most intimate sphere of his own 
spiritual life, he cannot manage without another consciousness. 
One person can never find complete fullness in himself alone. 
(Dostoevsky 177) 
Half-Rome, Other Half-Rome and Tertium Quid are no less affected by 
their process of construction of self through the other. None of the three faces 
the possibility of the gallows. Yet in dialogic terms, failure by them to be heard 
still represents a kind of death. Each attempts to constitute himself through 
language as an identity, and must contend with opposing voices and ideologies. 
If we read Books II, III, and IV in this manner, we see the texts not as reflections 
of the speakers' fixed characters, but as the process itself of character creation. 
Slinn argues that in reading monologues, we are required "to shift our focus, not 
to read language as an expression of a speaker's character, as a representation of 
belief, but to follow the processes by which a 'character' . . . is constituted in 
language. "24 
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This process of creation and presentation of self requires another, and the 
interlocutors of Books II, III, and IV fulfil this dialogic role for the speaker. "To 
be means to be for another and through the other, for oneself. A person has no 
internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary; looking 
inside himself he looks into the eyes of another or with the eyes of another" 
(Dostoevsky 287). 
V 
Chapters Two, Three and Four each examine how the speakers of Books 
II, III, and IV attempt to construct themselves on a personal level vis-a-vis their 
interlocutors and through the personal word. However, taken within the context 
of The Ring and the Book, Half-Rome, Other Half-Rome, and Tertium Quid 
compete for ideological supremacy. As their names suggest, they represent 
societal forces that are in constant hegemonic friction. Unless physical violence 
erupts, the battle is fought out at the site of language. Yet even when physical 
violence occurs--such as with the murder of the Comparini--comprehension, 
reaction and interpretation of the physical events can be made only through 
language. Living in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, Bakhtin made the 
same observation when he wrote that the "sign becomes an arena of the class 
struggle. "25 
The struggle for ideological dominance in Books II, III, and IV provides 
society with more than just a later received version of events. Subsequent 
speakers are in the process of being constructed through language. They will, in 
their turn, respond through language that has already been ideologically loaded, 
and they will speak as people who already have meaning. Hence, when Pompilia 
later speaks in Book VII, it is not as a tabula rasa. She has not literally heard 
Books II, III, and IV, but her speech contests politically the discourses of external 
structures which are ideologically opposed to hers. Pompilia is not a "blank 
page"26 on which she writes her own 'truth'. Her personal word struggles 
politically through the medium of language which is already ideologically loaded, 
to establish her own version of reality relative to the anticipated ideological 
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positions of Half-Rome, Other Half-Rome, and Tertium Quid. Therefore each 
chapter concludes by examining the personal word of the speakers for evidence 
of political struggle. 
This study is distinctive in its examination of the political implications of 
the personal word. Established commentary on The Ring and the Book has 
generally been restricted to accounts of subjectivity. Dialogism provides a 
necessary and useful model with which to examine the individual's construction 
of selfhood. However, unlike the monological model, dialogism also allows the 
political element to be introduced. Examination of political struggle for meaning 
through language can be extended indefinitely. Critics may choose to include 
social, historical, biographical, and even academic politics against and through 
which the speakers of The Ring and the Book must struggle in their language. 
However, this more modest study restricts itself to the opening triad of speakers, 
and purports to highlight only a few major skirmishes in the politics of language. 
The word itself, according to Bakhtin, 
is neutral with respect to any specific ideological function. It can 
carry out ideological functions of any kind .... The reality of the 
word, as is true of any sign, resides between individuals .... 
(Marxism 14) 
Hence, truth belongs to the realm of dialogue, and becomes itself contextual. On 
this basis we turn from truth to the language itself, and to the individuals who as 
signs themselves struggle for personal, ideological and political identity and 
supremacy in the arena of language. 
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